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During the past few years, social media platforms 
have been criticized for reacting slowly to users 
distributing misinformation and potentially dangerous 
conspiracy theories. Despite policies that have been 
introduced to specifically curb such content, this paper 
demonstrates how conspiracy theorists have thrived on 
Twitter during the COVID-19 pandemic and managed 
to push vaccine and health related misinformation 
without getting banned. We examine a dataset of 
approximately 8200 tweets and 8500 Twitter users 
participating in discussions around the conspiracy term 
Scamdemic. Furthermore, a subset of active and 
influential accounts was identified and inspected more 
closely and followed for a two-month period. The 
findings suggest that while bots are a lesser evil than 
expected, a failure to moderate the non-bot accounts 
that spread harmful content is the primary problem, as 
only 12.7% of these malicious accounts were suspended 
even after having frequently violated Twitter’s policies 
using easily identifiable conspiracy terminology. 
 
1. Introduction  
We may be living in a golden age of conspiracy 
theories [1, 2]. In everyday life, you can hear terms such 
as QAnon and Pizzagate, which previously belonged to 
the vocabulary of fringe groups but have increasingly 
been adopted by wider audiences and normalized as part 
of the vernacular by the news media and elected officials 
[3]. This “normalization” of conspiracy theories started 
well before the COVID-19 pandemic as several 
politicians, particularly in the United States, began 
promoting them during the 2016 and 2020 presidential 
elections. However, the coronavirus resulted in an 
eruption of new theories, ranging from 5G causing the 
virus [4] to the Great Reset that suggests the pandemic 
is being used as an excuse to take control of the world 
economy [5].  
The role of the social media platforms in spreading 
conspiracy theories has been tied to their loose 
regulation as well as to conspiracy theorists taking 
advantage of their algorithms to amplify the spread of 
content, bringing it from the obscure corners of the 
internet to the mainstream feeds of the general public. 
Some evidence supports the idea that bad actors have 
also become better at exploiting vulnerabilities of the 
algorithms that power modern content recommendation 
systems [6].  
Furthermore, recent studies have suggested that the 
conspiracy theories and misinformation related to the 
COVID-19 pandemic have been amplified by suspected 
bot accounts [7, 8]. For example, bots have been used to 
distribute conspiracy theories related to the pandemic 
alongside references to QAnon and the Great 
Awakening as well as to share links to other low 
credibility content and fake news sites [7]. Although the 
existence of bots in this context has been proven, the 
estimates of their prevalence range wildly.  
To reduce the reach of conspiracy theories, social 
media sites such as Twitter, Facebook and YouTube 
have begun moderating content more aggressively, 
suspending accounts that spread misinformation and 
shutting down groups that are devoted to or helping 
spread conspiracy theories [9]. For instance, many 
social networking sites have attempted to remove links 
and references to the Plandemic, which was a viral video 
that promoted several conspiracy theories related to 
COVID-19 and has become a term used to refer to the 
pandemic as an orchestrated epidemic or hoax [10]. 
While some social media sites like Facebook have seen 
a decline in the number of interactions with content 
containing misinformation during the recent years, in 
Twitter interactions with such content have been 
steadily growing [11].  
Moderating content on conspiracy theories is 
challenging. The propagators’ methods have evolved 
quickly, adapting to restrictions, developing new terms 
and adding nuance to content that is harder to identify 
as misinformation. When searching on Twitter with the 
term Plandemic, the social media site redirects the 
search to the word “pandemic” and provides a link to 
official information about the COVID-19 pandemic. 





But, when using the search term Scamdemic, Twitter 
does not attempt this redirection and users can even see 
tweets where the word or hashtag Plandemic is used in 
unison with the word Scamdemic. The difference 
between the words is minor, but the new term is 
unmistakably related and has been widely used without 
consequences. This is surprising considering Twitter’s 
policy update which banned sharing conspiracy theories 
about the pandemic or COVID-19 vaccines [12].  
Due to the possible negative effects on society and 
public health that conspiracy theories around the 
COVID-19 pandemic may have, it is important to 
evaluate the effectiveness of these content bans and to 
understand what is driving the conspiracy theories so 
that they can be addressed accordingly. The possible 
involvement of bots in the COVID-19 conspiracy theory 
discussions further complicates the study of the topic as 
well as the analysis of policies, as moderation of 
computer-generated content is far less ambiguous than 
the moderation of content made by humans. This is due 
to the use of bots for manipulation being clearly banned 
and the removal of such accounts will not result in 
dissatisfied users, whereas moderating genuine human 
accounts can lead to accusations of stifling free speech 
as well as users fleeing to competing social networking 
sites. Analysis of the level of bot involvement is thus 
needed as it will increase our understanding of whether 
the primary issue is genuine or inauthentic accounts. 
Furthermore, the policy recommendation will vary 
depending on what types of accounts are the primary 
source of misinformation. 
At the time of writing only few publications 
addressed the effectiveness of Twitter’s misleading 
information policy that was adjusted multiple times 
during the years 2020 and 2021 to reduce COVID-19 
related misinformation. The policy changes adjusted the 
criteria for suspensions and content removal and 
introduced a strike system for accounts, where 
repeatedly tweeting content containing misinformation 
would eventually lead to permanent suspension [12]. To 
address this research gap, and to provide a basis for 
future research, an exploratory study was conducted on 
a sample of COVID-19 conspiracy theory tweets that 
are using the conspiracy term “Scamdemic”, which is 
commonly used both as a hashtag or as a keyword in the 
tweet to signal that the pandemic is a conspiracy or 
hoax.  
The goal of this paper is two-fold. Firstly, it will 
investigate who are using the Scamdemic term on 
Twitter in order to determine whether the conspiracy 
theories are being pushed by coordinated attacks by bots 
and trolls or organically by users that believe in the 
conspiracy theories. Based on the findings on what type 
of accounts and content are evading the bans, the 
effectiveness and level of enforcement of current 
policies could be evaluated and policy changes 
suggested. Secondly, it will evaluate how well Twitter’s 
COVID-19 misleading information policy is enforced 
using the tweets containing the word “Scamdemic” as a 
case example.  
2. Related research 
The literature review is divided into three parts. The 
first part will summarize research related to the spread 
of misinformation in social media and explain what is 
currently known of the characteristics of COVID-19 
conspiracy content on Twitter. The second part will 
discuss what is known of bots and their ability to 
influence discussions on Twitter and provides a 
motivation for the method that will be used for bot 
detection in this study. Lastly, articles that are 
methodologically similar to this paper and use network 
analysis to study misinformation on Twitter will be 
reviewed. Overall, the goal is to establish and describe 
what has previously been observed in misinformation 
research and to justify the design choices outlined in the 
methodology section. 
2.1 Misinformation and conspiracy theories on 
social media 
The spread of conspiracy theories and 
misinformation has been widely studied [13] and the 
role of social media in distributing such content is a 
well-known issue [7]. New conspiracy theories and 
adaptations of earlier ones have appeared during the 
COVID-19 pandemic [14] and quickly reached wide 
audiences through social media platforms [4]. The 
conspiracy theory on the “Plandemic” which trended in 
multiple social media sites as a result of a viral video, is 
an example of COVID-19 influencing and modifying 
existing conspiracy theories related to vaccines [10]. 
One distinguishable characteristic of tweets 
involving conspiracy theories is that certain groups of 
hashtags and keywords are prevalent in them. For 
example, 5G is commonly mentioned due to the 
popularity of the related conspiracy theory that suggests 
the technology’s emergence is linked to the disease [4]. 
Plandemic tweets also often include hashtags or 
mentions of other indirectly related or unrelated 
conspiracy theories and common examples include 
QAnon and the Deep State [7, 10]. Furthermore, many 
tweets containing misinformation include links to both 
YouTube videos as well as fake news websites [4]. 
Social engagement metrics such as likes and 
retweets have been shown to increase the susceptibility 
of users to posts containing misinformation [15]. This 
suggests that the virality of conspiratorial content and 
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other misinformation is a threat precisely because 
people are unlikely to critically evaluate the source. 
Based on this, posts made by influential accounts that 
are retweeted and or liked in large numbers are a bigger 
threat than those made by less popular accounts, thus 
suggesting the focus of the analysis should be on them. 
Influential accounts are not the only issue behind 
the propagation of misinformation, as the design of the 
platforms and the way they promote content is a major 
part of the problem as well. One of the theories that is 
used to both describe behavior in online social networks 
as well as to support or oppose restrictive policies is the 
concept of “echo chambers” or alternatively “filter 
bubbles” [16, 17]. These echo chambers are formed as a 
result of recommendation systems that aim to maximize 
interaction by providing users of the social networking 
site with content such as tweets that matches their views 
and suggestions on which accounts to follow that share 
similar content [16]. The danger according to this theory 
is that an individual will be eventually exposed mainly 
to material that aligns with their world view giving a 
false sense of unanimity while only a small minority of 
individuals supports the belief. Due to not seeing 
material that challenges for example the conspiracy 
theories, the individuals become more entrenched in 
their bubble or echo chamber [17]. However, too 
aggressive moderation of content or the banning of 
entire communities is a risk as it may result in the users 
abandoning the platform and moving to an alternative 
social networking site that may further increase the 
divide and drive individuals to the fringe. 
2.2 The role of Twitter bots in the distribution 
of misinformation 
When using the term bot or bot account, this paper 
refers to basic spambots as well as social bots that are 
either fully or partially automated and engaging in 
distributing controversial content without self-
identifying as non-human. This is based on the 
definition given by Ferrara et al. [18].  
Many papers have discussed the role of bots in 
distributing fake news and misinformation [6, 19]. It is 
argued that at least their role in distributing content from 
low-credibility sources is disproportionately big [19]. 
The percentage of bots in the entire Twitter population 
has been estimated to be around 10% - 20%. However, 
in the case of accounts pushing the United States to 
reopen the country and to reduce COVID-19 restrictions 
it has been up to 50% [8]. Furthermore, there is evidence 
of social bots that are interacting predominantly with 
COVID-19 content, suggesting that their purpose is to 
spread or amplify misinformation related to the 
pandemic [7].  
One of the negative effects of bots, which further 
demonstrates their potential in the context of 
disseminating misinformation, is their assumed role in 
strengthening the spiral of silence [20]. The spiral of 
silence theory suggests that individuals monitor and 
attempt to understand the general opinion on a given 
topic and if they perceive themselves to be supporting 
the stance of the minority, they are likely to refrain from 
expressing their opinion [21, 16]. This ultimately affects 
other people’s perception of the topic and can lead to a 
setting where a silent majority accepts that the opposing 
view is the prevailing opinion of the population, while 
in fact it is supported by a vocal minority [21]. One 
recent study suggests that even a relatively small 
percentage of bots can affect online discussion and tip 
the perceived public opinion [20].  
A major issue in studies that investigate the role of 
bot accounts in the spread of misinformation is the 
difficulty of reliably detecting modern social bots. 
Recent papers focusing on Twitter bot detection rely 
increasingly on machine learning [22, 23, 24] and 
ensemble methods combining multiple classifiers due to 
the level of sophistication of bots as well as 
hybridization where both humans and programs control 
the accounts [25]. One particularly widely used example 
has been the Botometer (or originally BotOrNot), which 
has been featured in many of the most cited publications 
on social bots [26, 27]. However, fully automated bot 
detection may not be realistic [25, 26] because the 
results of such techniques have been shown to vary with 
new datasets. Therefore, relying on existing tools such 
as the Botometer alone and drawing conclusions without 
critical qualitative inspection appears no longer 
sufficient and thus in this paper a hybrid approach 
combining algorithmic and qualitative labeling is 
employed. 
2.3 Networks on Twitter 
Social network analysis has been widely used to 
study social media [28], how information spreads in 
networks [29] and which accounts are most influential 
in facilitating information spread [30]. Network models 
based on Twitter data can be built in multiple ways with 
the simplest examples being models where connections 
represent accounts following each other or mentioning 
each other in tweets. The networks can also represent 
relationships between content that is being shared such 
as tweets containing the same hashtag, and in that case 
the nodes can be the hashtags.  
Research has shown that in the case of 
misinformation, unverified accounts that do not belong 
to any well-known public figures influence the spread 
of conspiracy theories [31, 32]. However, the way in 
which these influential accounts are defined varies a lot 
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and influence can be measured in many ways. For 
example, when defining influence algorithmically, the 
most influential accounts can be those that are 
surrounded by highly retweeted accounts who 
commonly share the content of the less well-known 
account [31]. Simpler approaches rely on using different 
metrics related to the Twitter accounts such as the 
number of followers [30] and betweenness centrality 
[4]. 
3. Methodology 
3.1 Data collection 
The dataset consists of Twitter usernames, tweets 
and a mapping of the relationships between the different 
objects, which will be described in more detail under the 
network analysis section. The data was collected using 
Twarc, a Python library for accessing and retrieving data 
from the Twitter API. 
The data contains 8263 tweets and 8540 users 
interacting with or being related to these tweets. The 
data was gathered from the Twitter API with the 
tweets/search command and search term “scamdemic”. 
Users are considered related to a tweet if the tweet 
mentions the user, retweets or quotes the user or if it is 
a reply to a tweet made by the user. The dataset contains 
tweets posted during a one-week period starting on the 
8th of March and ending on the 15th of March 2021. The 
time was chosen based on Twitter having updated their 
COVID-19 misinformation policy at the beginning of 
the month. The script used to collect and process the 
data is based on a tool described in [33]. 
3.2 Network analysis 
The data was mapped so that two separate network 
graphs can be created. The first one is labeled the 
account-interaction network, which is a weighted 
directed network where nodes are accounts while the 
edges represent interactions towards other accounts with 
tweets. Weights are determined by how many times 
during the analysis period an account interacted with the 
other account by for example retweeting or mentioning 
them. The second is labeled the account-hashtag 
network and is a directed multimodal network where 
nodes are both hashtags as well as accounts and the 
edges indicate which hashtags an account interacted 
with. From now on, the first network will be referred to 
as the account-interaction network and the latter as the 
account-hashtag network. The networked data was 
analyzed both quantitatively, with standard network 
analysis metrics, as well as qualitatively by manually 
inspecting the most important nodes’ Twitter profiles. 
Overall, the purpose of this network analysis was to 
determine how the average account using the 
Scamdemic word behaved, which hashtags were used 
together, and by whom, and to identify which accounts 
were most prominent in the network.  
To make inferences on the effectiveness of 
Twitter’s policies, a population of influential accounts 
were selected based on the three node characteristics: 
betweenness centrality, indegree and the outdegree. A 
high indegree indicates that the account is often referred 
to in other tweets, while a high outdegree would indicate 
a spammer whose content are likely to be seen by 
individuals searching with the right keywords. Lastly, 
users with a high betweenness centrality are the 
accounts that act as a bridge between communities and 
discussions. Figure 1 illustrates these different node 
characteristics with the teal “A” node representing a 
node which has a high indegree, while the red node “B” 
has a high outdegree and the yellow node “C” a high 
betweenness centrality as it acts as a link between the 
two communities around the node “A” and node “B”. 
 
Heuristically, the 25 accounts with the highest 
betweenness centrality, in and outdegrees were 
determined to be influential, and consequently their 
activities reviewed twice during the two months 
following the collection of the dataset. As some 
influential nodes were in the top 25 of several 
characteristics, the final list of influential nodes consists 
of only 61 accounts. The rationale behind focusing on 
these accounts is that they should be among the first to 
be deleted due to their prominence assuming that they 
are in fact supporting the conspiracies and not 
attempting to debunk them. 
3.3 Bot detection and classifying accounts 
Several methods were used in conjunction to 
determine what types of accounts were participating in 
the discourse and if bots are amplifying the Scamdemic 
conspiracy. Firstly, the 61 most influential nodes were 
checked with the Botometer which provides a rating on 
	
Figure 1. Node characteristics example	
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the likelihood of the account being a bot rather than a 
classification. Secondly, manual inspection and coding 
was done to further validate the scores provided by the 
Botometer. This two-step classification of accounts 
should reduce the risk of misclassification tied to the 
Botometer’s scores [26]. All influential accounts were 
checked even if the Botometer suggested that they are 
not suspicious.  
In addition to labeling accounts as humans or bots, 
the manual inspection was used to bin the accounts into 
overlapping categories. The labels for these categories 
are conspiracy theorists, spammer, antivax, celebrity 
and non-believer. Conspiracy theorists are accounts that  
seemed to authentically believe and participate in the 
discussions. Spammers are accounts that solely push 
content through liking or retweeting. Antivaxxers are a 
subset of conspiracy theorists, mainly engaging with 
content questioning the safety of COVID-19 vaccines. 
Lastly, celebrity indicated prominent politicians and 
non-believers accounts that are participating in the 
discussions in order to debunk conspiracies. This 
manual inspection was conducted twice. First, a month 
after the collection of the dataset and a second time a 
month later to see on both occasions which accounts had 
been banned during the monitoring period and to 
follow-up on whether the coding was still accurate. 
Figure 2 shows the account-interaction network 
with influential human accounts being marked as black, 
and influential nodes suspected of being bots as red. Due 
to the metrics used to determine influence, the 
influential nodes are mostly in the center of a cluster of 
accounts or acting as a link between several clusters. 
3.4 Limitations 
Accessing Twitter’s API with Twarc does not 
guarantee that all tweets related to the search term are 
collected. This is due to the tool not supporting Twitter’s 
academic product track’s full-archive search. However, 
even small samples instead of full datasets have been 
successfully used in previous studies [4] and especially 
considering the relative niche status of the Scamdemic, 
a low volume of tweets can be expected. Furthermore, 
the dataset is small when compared to typical Twitter 
studies, but for the purposes of demonstrating how 
individual influential accounts can avoid bans while 
repeatedly posting content that is against the rules, it 
should be sufficient. 
 
 







 The account-interaction network which consisted 
of all the 8540 accounts in the discussions is very sparse.  
Most nodes are peripheral or separate from the main 
network with 83% of the nodes having an outdegree 
between 0 and 1, while 90% of the nodes have an 
indegree between 0 and 1, meaning that they have 
interacted with another account or been mentioned in a 
tweet 0-1 times. In all three previously described 
network characteristics that were used to define the 
influential accounts; the indegree, outdegree and 
betweenness centrality, the top 10 to 25 accounts are 
distinguishable from the rest by having values that are 
several hundred or even thousand percent higher than 
the mean. 
 Figure 3 represents the account-interaction 
network that was created using Gephi with the Force 
Atlas 2 layout algorithm. The different colors represent 
communities that were identified based on the 
modularity. There are several influential nodes that have 
large communities of accounts interacting with them 
while most are in hardly visible small clusters of 2-3 
accounts. 
From the list of 61 influential accounts, only five 
were identified as public organizations, well-known 
individuals or politicians that commented on the 
conspiracies or who were mentioned in the discussions. 
Furthermore, only one of these five accounts was a 
supporter of COVID-19 conspiracy theories. 
Additionally, in the case of one of the participants, it 
was unclear whether they were debunking or promoting 
the conspiracies.  
This is in line with previous research which 
suggests that with misinformation, most of the 
influential accounts are not verified users or public 
figures. The remaining 55 accounts were a mix of trolls, 
bots and users assumed to be authentic conspiracy 
theorists or believers and thus can be referred to as 
malicious accounts. Only six accounts had been banned 
after a month and three had been renamed and thus were 
no longer characterizable. On the second inspection two 
months after the data was collected, one additional 
account had been suspended and two more renamed 
making them untraceable.  
Defining the exact type of the malicious accounts 
proved to be difficult as their goals were not clear in 
most cases. By looking at the profile descriptions and 
content that they tweeted and retweeted, in some cases 
the motives as well as their assumed country of origin 
	
Figure 3. The account-interaction network clustered into communities 
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were identifiable. Surprisingly, over 40 percent of the 
influential accounts were interacting with COVID-19 
content originating or related to Great Britain and 
British politics, which suggests that the word 
Scamdemic is popular in the British Twitter conspiracy 
theory circles, or that the sample was taken during a time 
in which the word was trending in the United Kingdom. 
According to the Botometer, from the list of most 
influential accounts only five were given a score above 
4 on a scale of 1-5 by the Botometer. The universal, or 
language independent score was used as not all accounts 
were tweeting in English. Two of these assumed bot 
accounts were banned at the time of writing and one was 
manually reclassified as a human on closer inspection. 
During the manual labeling, thirteen accounts were 
labeled as likely to be bots based on their behavior, 
which usually included mass retweeting and spamming 
of hashtags and mentions. The thirteen suspected bot 
accounts included all except one of the five accounts 
labeled by the Botometer as highly likely of being a bot. 
This would indicate that the qualitative labeling was 
more aggressive than the Botometer, which tends to be 
conservative with its estimates.  
Overall, these thirteen suspected bot accounts 
represent a quarter of the influential accounts which is 
on the high end of the assumed share of bot accounts on 
Twitter, but on the low end of the estimates of the 
analyses that looked into the share of bots in COVID-19 
misinformation tweets [6, 8]. 
4.2 The content  
The content analysis focused on the different 
hashtags that were used since they play an important 
role in making a particular topic recognizable and easy 
to find on social networking sites such as Twitter. The 
capitalization was removed in order to combine some of 
the otherwise identical hashtags, such as Scamdemic 
and scamdemic which were initially treated as unique 
hashtags. A total of 3127 hashtags were used in the 8263 
tweets and the ten most used ones represent 34.9% of all 
hashtags. 
Figure 4 shows the account-hashtag network, where 
nodes are a mix of hashtags as well as the accounts that 
used them in their tweets. The communities are less 
distinct as in the previously discussed account-
interaction network, which is due to the common 
practice of including multiple hashtags in posts. Several 
somewhat separate communities can be seen at the 
edges of the network, such as the pink cluster of non-
English hashtags on the left side of the graph and calls 
to participate in rallies in the gray cluster at the top. 
Unsurprisingly, the most frequently used hashtag 
was #scamdemic which was used over 500 times in the 
dataset, followed by the over 200 mentions of #covid19 
	
Figure 4. The account-hashtag network 
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in various ways of writing, which were merged with 
fuzzy matching. At third place was #plandemic which 
had been used over 100 times despite being a 
particularly scrutinized word. Other much used hashtags 
included the popular Great Reset (#thegreatreset) and 
New World Order (#nwo) conspiracy theories, as well 
as a large variety of different references to the COVID-
19 vaccine. The table below shows the top ten hashtags, 
which includes generic pandemic related words such as 
lockdown and vaccines in addition to the terms linked 
to conspiracy theories. Most hashtags are in English, 
although German and other minor European languages 
were used in small numbers as well. Table 1 shows the 
ten most popular hashtags and how many times they 
were used in the dataset.  
 














One of the main objectives of the study was to 
determine the nature of the accounts that were 
participating in the distribution of the Scamdemic 
conspiracy term by looking closely at a sample of 61 
highly active and influential accounts. Furthermore, by 
following these influential accounts for a duration of 
two months the research aims to highlight the lack of 
moderation and enforcement of Twitter’s policies 
against misinformation. The design of the study makes 
it difficult to draw conclusion on the implications that 
the findings have on existing theories used in 
misinformation research. During the qualitative 
inspection of the influential accounts, the lack of critical 
comments against the COVID-19 conspiracy theories 
can however suggest that the active participants are 
within an echo chamber and or that the spiral of silence 
is making it difficult for the participants to voice critical 
comments, but this will be verified with more thorough 
analysis during future studies. Thus, the discussion in 
this paper will be centered on the empirical evidence and 
based on the key implications, a critical commentary on 
the current status is provided. Lastly, recommendations 
on how to adjust Twitter’s misleading information 
policy are given.  
Interestingly, a majority of the influential accounts 
that are using the Scamdemic word and participating in 
the spread of other related conspiracy theories, seem to 
be legitimate users rather than bots. Moreover, most of 
the suspected bot accounts were merely retweeting 
conspiracy theories constantly without producing any 
original tweets, indicating that they are operating with 
crude scripts rather than more sophisticated programs 
found in modern social bots. Of the 55 accounts defined 
as malicious and influential the rate at which they were 
banned is surprisingly low at 12.7%, with only 6 bans 
during the first month and one additional ban after two 
months. Previous research has focused predominantly 
on how modern misinformation is spread by advanced 
social bots and coordination but based on the sample 
used in this study, both the bots and humans could 
merely continuously retweet and post malicious content 
without consequences. Therefore, the level of 
sophistication of the accounts avoiding suspension is 
likely lower than previously assumed.  
In order to analyze Twitter’s moderation and how 
well they follow their new policy, we looked at the 
content produced and shared by the influential accounts. 
Content wise it seems that using indirect or novel words 
and hashtags to avoid suspension is not needed on 
Twitter. This is based on the observation that using 
words and hashtags known to be associated with 
misinformation, or directly implying for example that 
the pandemic is a hoax (e.g., #plandemic and 
#scamdemic) are not being removed. 
Only one instance of a tweet being flagged as 
against Twitter’s rules was detected during the review 
of the influential accounts. Based on this, the content is 
not getting actively flagged and censored even in 
obvious cases. Considering that flagging a tweet rather 
than deleting it is a much lighter approach and is already 
employed by Twitter, it is questionable why it is not 
used more actively. 
From the findings on the accounts and content that 
they engage with, Twitter’s ability or interest to enforce 
its COVID-19 misinformation policy seems very weak. 
Almost 90% of the inspected accounts were openly 
tweeting or retweeting using easily identifiable words 
and hashtags related to popular conspiracy theories 
without getting suspended. Approximately a quarter of 
the influential accounts were also spreading anti-
vaccine content, which is another topic when discussed 
in the context of COVID-19 that violates Twitter’s 
misinformation policy. It is especially surprising how 
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these accounts that are posting multiple types of content 
that should automatically raise alarms do not get 
removed or filtered from public searches. Interestingly 
even names and bios containing the word covid and 
mentions of Scamdemic or other conspiracy words had 
managed to not be suspended. 
5.2 Policy recommendations 
Lastly, two suggestions on how to mitigate the 
further spread of misinformation are provided. Due to 
the simplicity of the accounts involved, relatively basic 
changes to policy would reduce the visibility of the 
misinformation and conspiracy theories.  
Firstly, more aggressively suspending accounts 
according to the current misinformation policy based on 
repeated use of known conspiracy theory terms is 
suggested. Particularly accounts involved in the 
distribution of conspiracies such the Plandemic as well 
as other vaccine related misinformation have a clear 
lexicon and should be targeted similarly as the accounts 
spreading the Plandemic are on Facebook, where 
suspensions are given more frequently. Considering that 
Twitter already attempts to filter content by requiring an 
additional click to access the tweets when querying with 
the search term Plandemic, it is clear that they are 
already capable of identifying the misinformation but 
abstaining from removing it. In other words, this 
recommendation simply suggests that Twitter should 
enforce its own current policies.  
Secondly, considering that the most incriminating 
hashtags and vocabulary such as the Plandemic and 
Scamdemic are used by the malicious accounts to make 
content easy to find, filtering the tweets containing them 
from the search results would reduce their visibility 
even without the need of removing the content or 
associated accounts. This would also avoid false 
positives leading to bans of accounts that are not 
promoting conspiracies but in fact attempting to debunk 
them. 
6. Conclusion  
The different misinformation, fake news as well as 
conspiracies surrounding the COVID-19 pandemic have 
been studied from many angles despite of the recentness 
of the topic. The goal of this paper was to contribute to 
the understanding of what types of accounts are 
distributing the conspiracy theories and misinformation 
related to the pandemic, as well as demonstrate that 
Twitter is not highly successful at mitigating the spread 
of misinformation. The study found limited evidence of 
bot accounts dedicated to spreading misinformation 
related to the COVID-19 pandemic as the share of 
assumed bots when compared to human operated 
accounts was lower than expected. However, the 
findings were in line with previous research that cites 
humans as the most likely cause of misinformation 
spreading. Lastly, the study suggests that stricter 
enforcement is needed, and that the situation could be 
improved by merely removing or filtering content that 
contains certain keywords or hashtags such as 
#scamdemic and #plandemic. 
This paper highlighted how it is possible for 
influential accounts to repeatedly share content that is 
against Twitter’s policies during a short time without 
having the content removed or the associated accounts 
suspended. Future studies would benefit of having a 
longer monitoring period than the two months used for 
this study, as this could provide insights on whether in 
the long-term enforcement of the policies is more 
successful. Furthermore, by expanding the list of 
keywords and conducting the longitudinal study on a 
larger group of accounts, more inferences could be made 
on which type of behavior and terminology in tweets 
manages to evade suspension. 
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